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Abstract 
This  paper  discusses  Derrida’s  deconstruction  of  both  representational  and  post-
representational  thinking,  in  pointing  out  that  they  both  assume  a  realist  or 
representational paradigm as its assumption. It examines Rosemary Hawker’s contention 
that Derrida’s argument is one fundamentally concerned about the inseparability of idiom 
and  content,  and  argues  that  indeed  this  was  an  accurate  reading;  Heidegger  and 
Shapiro’s  fallacy  as  interpreted  by  Derrida  is  precisely  the  trap  of  metaphysical  and 
representational  thinking  in  assuming  that  content  is  separable  from  form.  It  also 
examines  Marcellini  and  Haber’s  arguments  that  Derrida’s  arguments  are  about  the 
failure  of  the  representational  paradigm  of  thinking  as  there  is  always  a  surplus  and 
excess of meaning because each rendering differs from its origin. Finally it finds out that 
there is no such thing as pure representation as art always renders its object with a 
difference, or differance. 
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In The Truth in Painting, Heidegger’s attempt to ‘go beneath or behind the 
metaphysical determination of truth (Derrida, 1987:30) remains committed to the 
anthropological  project.  While  Heidegger  sought  to  break  away  from 
representation,  Heidegger  remained  humanist  and  anthropomorphic.  Derrida 
illustrates this through examining the Heidegger-Shapiro correspondence about 
Van  Gogh’s  shoes  to  explore  this  theme.  Derrida  contrasts  Shapiro,  the  city 
dweller, with Heidegger, the champion of peasant ideology, and illustrates the 
paradox of the controversy- that both contenders share more common ground 
that they believe – the trap of representational thinking. Rather than defend either 
Heidegger or Shapiro, he exposes the ‘tacit institution’ in their correspondence. 
(Derrida,  1987:281)  The  shared  institutional  commitment  concerns  a 
representational  mode  of  epistemology.  Derrida  thinks  Shapiro  is  trapped  in 
representational  thinking  in  seeking  the  identity  of  the  person  who  dons  the 
shoes, while Heidegger is trapped more subtly.  
In disputing the identity of the person who dons the shoes, Derrida alleges 
that  both  Shapiro  and  Heidegger  have  assumed  the  traditional  paradigm  of 
painting – realism and representation. Both assume that the shoes must belong 
to a real correspondent person – a peasant or Van Gogh, which the painting 
merely depicts or represents. While Shapiro takes a strictly realist approach to 
the picture in insisting it is Van Gogh’s depiction of his own city shoes, Heidegger 
too does not escape the trap of representation in assuming that the shoes’ status 
as equipment must be disclosed by the painting, which presupposes the Platonic 
idea of the naked thing stripped of use value, prior to the painting which the 
painting  must  henceforth disclose  or  unconceal  as  equipment or  of  utility,  as 
Derrida calls it, a being-product. This artistic presencing of the authentic mode of 
the shoes as equipment and utility is but another form of representational thinking 
that Heidegger fails to escape, although Heidegger proclaims his work a form of 
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post-metaphysical and post-representational thinking. The ghost of Plato and his 
concept of the naked thing haunts Heidegger’s conception of aletheia.  
Derrida argues that Heidegger has not escaped a metaphysical concept of the 
thing in conceiving in terms of a matter-form complex. Derrida further notes that 
Heidegger  is  more  interested  in  the  thing  as  a  metaphysical  object  to  be 
unconcealed,  than  as  an  artwork-  that  form  and  matter  –  is  renamed  the 
concealed  and  unconcealed  through  Heidegger’s  treatise  on  the  artwork,  but 
presumes  a  similar  metaphysical  and  ontological  structure.  Hence  Heidegger 
repeats metaphysics rather than deviates from it.  
Derrida thus contends that Heidegger assumes the Platonic conception of form 
and  matter  by  conceiving  of  the  thing  divested  of  use  value,  a  naked  thing 
stripped of its equipmentality, and the artwork that unconceals its use value or 
equipmentality for us. Derrida argues that the ‘naked’ thing is an import from 
Plato and that the remainder is not a naked thing as the object is nothing outside 
its mediation- the signified is nothing outside the signifier and the transcendental 
is nothing outside the empirical. Derrida argues that Heidegger’s realm of the 
‘concealed’  naked  thing  stripped  of  equipmentality  and  use  value  is  a 
metaphysical abstraction that has imprints of Platonic metaphysical thought in it. 
Thus  Heidegger,  for  all  his  post-metaphysical  and  post-representational 
rhethoric,  repeats  metaphysics  rather  than  managing  to  escape  it  with  his 
reconfiguration  or  truth  as  aletheia.  Derrida  is  not  however  critical  of  this 
repetition  of  metaphysics,  he  only  contends  that  it  does  not  set  out  what 
Heidegger  sought  to  do-  which  was  to  destroy  and  overcome  metaphysics. 
Derrida wishes to point out the aporias of this destruction which paradoxically 
becomes repetition rather than negation. 
  Derrida argues that both Shapiro’s realism and Heidegger’s aletheia are 
committed to a form of representative epistemology which involves detachment 
of the object from its context and re-attaching it to another function or identity, be 
it a person in the form of Van Gogh or a function as being-product and utility. 
Representation,  in  the  form  of  referential  signification,  is  thus  implicit  in  both 
Shapiro’s realism and Heidegger’s aletheia.  
Derrida  refers  to  the  logic  of  representation  as  the  logic  of  the  cut  or 
decontextualization. This logic of decontextualization or the logic of the cut leads 
to opposition as the object is made to refer to that which is entirely other. Derrida 
argues  that  this  logic  of  opposition  or  decontextualization,  or  strict  reference, 
sublates differance. Derrida points out to the aporia of such an opposition – it is 
simultaneously stricturation and destricturation as it removes the object from its 
context to refer it to a meaning wholly other, be it in terms of identity of a person 
or  function  of  utility  in  terms  of  being  product.  It  thus  frees,  while  binding 
simultaneously, however this movement suppresses and sublates differance as it 
binds the object to the meaning which is wholly other rather than examining the 
play between object and referent, which is an indeterminable space rather than 
the strict determinate space of representation as Heidegger and Shapiro would 
have it.  
In  the  above  passage  Derrida  seems  to  argue  that  re-attachment  involves  a 
certain violence in putting uselessness to utility, thus removing its surplus value 
and subjecting it entirely to utility. In giving itself fully to utility and remarking it 
entirely as useful, the differance, surplus and indeterminacy of object is erased 
by  lending  itself  fully  to  representation  as  something  useful,  or  equipment. 
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escape representational violence as it designates uselessness and utility as a 
metaphysical and ontological duality that reinscribes aletheia in representation 
and  metaphysics.  Heidegger’s  thought  thus  does  not  escape  the  trap  of 
representational thinking and indeed re-inscribes its metaphysical structure and 
repeats it in every sense.  
Derrida  thus  further  argues  that  Heidegger,  for  all  his  post-representational 
rhetoric, has assumed the fundamental metaphysical concept of the thing which 
bears  imprints  of  Plato  in  its  matter-form  division.  Derrida  also  argues  that 
Heidegger’s aletheia divides representation into ‘being product’ or thing 2, and 
pre-disclosed thing naked of equipmental function, or thing I, and this falls into 
the  trap  of  repeating  the  fundamental  representational  logic  of  thing  and 
perception or signified and signifier, although he claims to have eluded in aletheia 
by  renaming  it  pre-disclosure  and  disclosed  being-product.  Heidegger  thus 
assumes  the  ontological  structure  and  vocabulary  of  representational  thinking 
and  metaphysics  by  betraying  a  dual  ontological  structure  to  his  post-
metaphysics,  dividing  it  into  pre-disclosure  and  being-product.  Hence, 
Heidegger’s post-representational thought is not subversion but repetition and 
paradoxically affirmation of metaphysics and representational thinking.  
  Derrida  contends  to  conceive  of  the  naked  thing,  prior  to  disclosure, 
translates into an absurdity as signifier is not separable from signified, meaning is 
irrevocably mediated, the shoes are only disclosed to us as being-product and 
not as a naked thing stripped of equipmentality. This is because presupposing 
the  naked  thing  repeats  the  ontological  structure  of  metaphysics  by  dividing 
perception  into  pre-disclosure  and  post-disclosure,  hence  betraying  a  dual 
ontological structure that resembles metaphysics and representational thinking. 
We  know  of  no  naked  thing  as  an  abstraction  apart  from  its  mediation  as 
equipment,  Derrida  argues  that  abstracting  the  naked  thing  assumes  Plato’s 
matter-form division and hence repeats metaphysics. There is thus no division 
between  disclosed  thing,  and  its  remainder,  the  naked  thing;  as  what  we 
encounter  is  the  mediation  of  the  transcendental  and  the  empirical  in 
encountering the pair of shoes as useful without conceiving it as an abstraction 
that exists prior to representation. Heidegger by abstracting the naked thing thus 
repeats the ontological structure of representational thinking, thus paradoxically 
affirming representational thinking rather than deviating from it with his notion of 
aletheia.  
  Rosemary Hawker argues that Derrida thinks that painting is inseparable 
from its idiom:  
Idiom and truth are for Derrida found to coalesce in a letter written by 
Cézanne, which include the statement, "I owe you the truth in painting and I will 
tell it to you." (Derrida, 1987:2) Derrida seizes on Cézanne's promise as both a 
highly idiomatic statement and a powerful model of idiom. This short sentence is 
able to refer simultaneously, and in a manner that escapes adequate translation, 
to three relations of truth and painting: first, to Cézanne's knowledge of the truth 
of the medium; second, to the truth of the world as rendered in painting; and, 
third, to the truth about painting as told through language. In turning to Cézanne's 
statement, the idiom in painting, with which Derrida began, has now become the 
truth in painting. Here truth is both the problem of representation more broadly 
and specifically the problem of representing the medium of painting, or rather 
representing  the  medium  of painting  in  writing. Derrida's final  configuration of 
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the equation, joining idiom, truth, and painting, but only insofar as it makes clear 
the  folly  of  attempting  to  fasten  on  the  idiomatic,  much  less  to  reproduce  it. 
Derrida writes:  
One is always tempted by this faith in idiom: it supposedly says only one 
thing, properly speaking, and says it only in linking form and meaning too strictly 
to lend itself to translation. But if the idiom were this, were it what it is thought it 
must be, it would not be that, but it would lose all strength and would not make a 
language. (Derrida, 1987:7) 
Here  Derrida  identifies  the  paradox  of  idiom.  We  know  what  idiom  is 
meant to be, we understand its functioning in language in the broadest sense. 
Yet when we try to extract an instance of the idiomatic for contemplation we can 
be  sure that what we have in our sights is the appearance of a form far too 
nuanced  to  be  isolated.  When  we  use  idiomatic  language,  we  do  so 
unselfconsciously;  to  become  conscious  of  our  use  of  idiom  is  to  have  the 
essential feature of that idiomatic usage slip away from us. (Hawker: 2002) 
Hence as we have been discussing in this paper, painting according to 
Derrida is inseparable from its idiom. We have been discussing this aspect of 
painting in this paper as the inseparability of the transcendental and empirical, 
painting  is  not  separable  from  its  representation  as  mode;  painting  is  only 
realized through its mode of representation. While we have previously discussed 
how  Heidegger  and  Shapiro  assume  the  trap  of  representational  thinking  in 
assuming realism and aletheia as a form of disclosure, Hawker here suggests 
that Derrida’s intervention was to imply that painting is not divisible from its mode 
or idiom, indeed we have seen that Heidegger and Shapiro’s attempts to abstract 
a  metaphysical  object  as  the  painter  or  the  being  product  of  the  shoes’ 
equipmentality only sets up a false Platonic dichotomy between object and its 
representation,  while  Hawker  argues  that  Derrida  would  affirm  that  idiom  is 
fundamental to rendering the object, the object knows no realization outside its 
idiom. As Hawker interprets Derrida, and as I would affirm, Derrida highlights that 
representation is mediation, content is inseparable from its mode of production, 
this  is  what  Derrida  elsewhere  calls  iterability, or  repetition  with a  difference. 
Hawker thus suggests painting is nothing outside its rendering or representation, 
as content is inseparable from idiom, and this is an argument I would agree with 
and affirm as I have demonstrated in this paper that the fallacy of Heidegger and 
Shapiro according to Derrida is the trap of representational thinking in assuming 
form and content are separate, while Derrida would argue that form and content 
are related in a dynamic relation of iterability and difference. Content knows no 
instantiation outside its mode, painting is not divisible into subject and object, 
these  are  one  and  the  same.  Painting  is  nothing  outside  its  idiom;  it  is  not 
separable from idiom, but rendered and mediated through its idiom. 
John  Haber  argues  that  Derrida  anticipated  issues  of  representational 
thinking and its aporia, in The Truth in Painting. As Haber argues, Derrida noted 
how "rendering" (in both French and English) means both returning to its owner 
and  representing.  According  to  Haber,  in  the  historian's  appeal  to  the  facts, 
Derrida too often detects recourse to a human stand-in for a painting's meanings. 
The painting acts suspiciously as a "natural" home for the elusive objects that the 
painter has so disconcertingly strewn about. The shoes may make a pair, and 
they may belong to Van Gogh, but the painting does not say.  Vincent Van Gogh 
does not reveal the owner of the shoes whose life his painterly gestures may 
seem  to  uncover.  Haber  shows  that  Derrida  cites  a  letter  of  Cézanne  that 69  Metaphysics and Representation: Derrida’s Views on the Truth in Painting 
 
 
promises la verité en peinture—to paint truthfully, or maybe to paint the truth, or 
to speak truthfully about his art, or to paint in fidelity to the medium. In this, Haber 
argues that Derrida sees the painter's dedication to opposing truths. According to 
Haber, meaning, communication, and historical context threaten to collide. So too 
do the difficult promises that these unleash. Haber states that a promise, Derrida 
notes, is what a philosopher, J. L. Austin, had called a performative—a statement 
that  does  something  rather  than  pronounces  fact.  Haber  argues  that  every 
painting wishes to be an act much like the Arnolfinis' wedding vow, a promise of 
certain meaning within a fixed historical frame that no art can ever have. A work 
of  art  resembles a  game or  a hypothesis.  Haber  states  that for  an  example, 
Derrida looks at Meyer Schapiro, a defender of modern art who was writing about 
van Gogh's painting of two shoes. Schapiro was criticizing a sentimental essay 
from Martin Heidegger., someone else with a past tied up with Nazi Germany. 
According to Haber, Derrida thinks the art historian used facts rigidly to settle 
scores. Derrida says that art historians make a game out of restoring a painting 
to  its  owner—which  might  be  the  painter,  the  viewer,  or  the  subject.  Haber 
wonders if entrapment between truths and between fictions is inevitable, perhaps 
it is the most fruitful place to be. Haber suggests there is no such thing as pure 
witness or representation. There is no one true witness to a painting’s event. 
Haber wonders if it is worthwhile to search for witnesses. According to Haber, if a 
painting is a reconstruction, its artist a visionary, its images a turning back of 
vision, and all its witnesses a fiction, it attests to the human need to remember. 
Haber argues that like a photo album or a maiden name, it does not recover the 
past, no more than it can put the past at a safe distance. What Haber lends to the 
discussion of the Truth in Painting is the inadequacy of representation and the 
failure of  the  artist  representing  art as  a true  or  pure  witness.  Derrida  would 
concur in The Truth in Painting that the representational paradigm is a failed 
paradigm, because each representation differs from the original and its meaning 
always exceeds the origin through the relay of differance, the gap between the 
painting  and  its  object.  I  would  concur  with  Haber  that  the  representational 
paradigm of painting seems inadequate according to Derrida, because Derrida 
would argue that each rendering separates the image from its origin in surplus 
and differance of meaning. Elsewhere, Derrida argues that meaning is relayed 
only through the passage of differance, each empirical instantiation of an origin 
has to differ from it spatially and temporally, and hence become altered in its re-
inscription  as  repetition  with  a  difference.  Each  representation  supplants 
presence. Each reproduction is an iterated form, a separation and differing from 
the original mark which knows no instantiation outside this structure of repetition. 
Rendering would always thus fail, because each rendition differs from the original 
as a trace, or imperfect rendition of the origin, if this indeed exists; as Derrida 
argues there is nothing outside the text, meaning is irrevocable mediated. As 
argued earlier, content and idiom are inseparable. They do not exist outside the 
fundamental structure of mediation that relate each other in a dynamic relation of 
differance. 
Anthony  Marcellini  argues  that  in  The  Truth  in  Painting,  Derrida 
deconstructs  an  argument  between  Martin  Heidegger  and  Meyer  Shapiro 
concerning the origin of a ghost haunting a pair of shoes in a Van Gogh painting. 
According  to  Marcellini,  Derrida  analyzes  both  Heidegger’s  position—who 
believes  that  the  shoes  are  those  of  an  unnamed  peasant—and  Mayer 
Shapiro’s—who believes that the shoes belong to the artist Van Gogh. Marcellini 70  Rupkatha Journal  Vol 2 No 1 
 
 
argues that despite both thinkers very thorough arguments; in the end Derrida 
resolves that neither Shapiro nor Heidegger are right, because there is really no 
way to know to whom the shoes belong. Marcellini argues that everything is a 
presumption of truth. “nothing proves or can prove that ‘they are the shoes of the 
artist’”. Derrida says. “Each time you read ‘they are clearly…,’ ‘this is clearly…,’ 
‘are evidently…,’  it does not  signify  that  it  is  clear or  evident,  very  much  the 
contrary, but that it is necessary to deny the intrinsic obscurity of the thing, its 
essential crypt, and that it’s necessary to make us believe that it is clear, quite 
simply because the proof will always be lacking” (1), he says. 
Marcellini argues that to close down individual interpretation, by claiming 
that the shoes can only be read in one way, seems to Derrida to be entirely 
against the purpose of the arts. Making them specific and prescribed rather than 
interpretive.  According  to  Marcellini,  Derrida  recounts  the  disenchantment  he 
feels following these philosophers words. “One follows step by step the moves of 
a  ‘great  thinker,’  as  he  returns  to  the  origin  of  the  work  of  art  and  of  truth, 
traversing  the  whole  history  of  the  West  and  then  suddenly,  at  a  bend  in  a 
corridor,  here  we  are  on  a  guided  tour,  as  schoolchildren  or  tourists.”  (2) 
According to Marcellini, the thinker has ceased to be a thinker for Derrida and is 
now simply dictating his own presumptions as fact, like the tour guide of the 
museum. Marcellini states that this entails only one answer, and that audience 
becomes a blind follower of the guide under this model. 
Marcellini recounts a story told by his professor, Joseph Tanke, about a 
boy  who  is  harshly  silenced  and  rebuked  by  a  museum  tour  guide  when he 
responds to her question what might have influenced the visual form of a certain 
Jasper Johns painting, that perhaps it was the floor of the museum, which looks 
very similar to the painting. According to Marcellini, here the boy is as right about 
Johns as Heidegger and Shapiro are about Van Gogh. Marcellini argues that 
there is no way of knowing what Van Gogh or Johns intended, which closes 
interpretation. Marcellini eventually affirms that the truth of art is the boy, the 
museum guide, Shapiro and Heidegger all agreeing that there are multiple truths. 
Hence, Marcellini brings to the discussion of The Truth in Painting the 
idea that the correspondence theory of truth- or that subject correlates to object, 
fails  in  art  because  aesthetics  is  perspectivism  and  subjectivity  rather  than 
representation. As Marcellini argues, and I would concur about Derrida, meaning 
always  exceeds  its  origin  by  being  subject  to  interpretation.  Marcellini  hence 
confirms what I have been arguing in this essay, that Derrida argues that the 
representational mode of thinking for aesthetics is a failed paradigm, because 
there is nothing outside the text, representation assumes a correlation between 
the signifier and signified, while Marcellini would argue, and I would affirm, that 
Derrida  argues  for  a  surplus  and  excess  of  meaning  that  exceeds  its  origin. 
Heidegger  and  Shapiro  thus  operate  by  the fallacy of  the  realist  paradigm  in 
assuming rendering is a theory of correspondence or an objective reality, where 
Derrida  demonstrates  that  art  always  exceeds  its  origin  and  differs  from  the 
original  as  differance.  As  argued  with  Haber,  the  representational  mode  of 
painting is founded upon failed assumptions because representation is always 
excess and surplus, differing from the original across the passage of differance 
and iterability. Representation only retrospectively produces the original because 
painting is nothing outside its rendering, content is inseparable from idiom. 
In terms of style, Truth in Painting is written in a highly elliptical form in 
order to capture the fact that representation never fully renders its meaning, and 71  Metaphysics and Representation: Derrida’s Views on the Truth in Painting 
 
 
thus  Derrida’s  deconstruction  of  both  representational  realism  and  post-
representational aletheia shows that there will always be a surplus of meaning, 
an excess, as well as its caesuras and silences and gaps between meaning, that 
will  render  fully  accurate  representation  inadequate.  Derrida,  through  formal 
elements  such  as  breaks,  ellipsis,  and  punctuation,  demonstrates  that  no 
rendering in painting is ever adequate and there is always a surplus of meaning, 
or  differance.  Derrida  demonstrates  through  these  formal  aspects  of 
representation with his writing such as the use of ellipsis and punctuation that 
pure representation that correlates to a transcendental signified, be it a referent 
or  utility,  does  not  quite happen as  there  is  always  a  surplus and  excess of 
meaning, or differance. 
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